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LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY. By 
Milner S. Ball. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1985. Pp. 
xiv, 191. $24. 
Milner S. Ball's1 Lying Down Together: Law, Metaphor, and The-
ology is an ambitious, idiosyncratic, and ultimately disappointing at-
tempt to define a new metaphor for understanding and using law. 
Professor Ball argues that one should think of law in metaphorical 
terms, insofar as metaphors are ubiquitous in our society. Not only 
are they descriptive "tools of sportscasters and poets, but [they are 
also] a kind of fundamental sense whereby we understand the world, 
perceiving one experience in terms of another" (p. 22). 
But while metaphors presumably can enrich human understanding 
by illustrating abstract concepts (e.g., "labor is a resource" (p. 22)), . 
the danger is that they can also limit our understanding to the point of 
view embodied in the metaphor. As Ball notes in relation to the above 
example, "If labor is viewed only as a resource, then exploitation is 
masked by neutral-sounding economic statements (e.g., the cost of la-
bor, like that of all resources, should be held down; cheap labor is 
good) which hide human misery behind an unexamined metaphor" (p. 
22). Thus, Ball argues, "[w]ithout access to alternate metaphors, we 
act and think on the basis of limited comprehension masquerading as 
the whole truth" (p. 22). 
In Ball's view, metaphor has equal usefulness, and potential for 
harm, when applied to the law. More specifically, his basic premise is 
I. Professor of Law, University of Georgia. 
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that society has too long languished under the metaphorical strictures 
of law as "the bulwark of freedom" (p. 23), without attempting to 
uncover alternate metaphors. Under the "bulwark" metaphor, the law 
seeks to protect entrenched and powerful interests by erecting barriers 
that deny weaker interests access to justice. In order to combat the 
unfairness and insensitivity embodied in such a system, Professor Ball 
urges that society adopt the alternative metaphor of law as a "me-
dium" instead of a "bulwark." 
Law as medium is a defensive metaphor. As opposed to law as 
bulwark, law as medium seeks not. to achieve simple law and order, 
but rather seeks to promote "responsible human intercourse" (p. 33). 
Ball believes that in a world in which the law-as-medium metaphor is 
fully accepted, communication between all classes of people would be 
perfect, class conflict would be correspondingly reduced, and there 
would be no need for the limits and barriers of the bulwark. 
There are, of course, inherent limitations to the applicability of 
theoretical models to real-world legal issues. 2 The author attempts to 
address these limitations by devoting three of the book's six chapters 
to a discussion of how "law as medium" is manifested in various 
guises in the developing law of the sea and coast. In these chapters, he 
seeks to apply the abstract ideas posited in the first two chapters to an 
important and real legal forum. 
Because professor Ball's conception of law as medium presupPioses 
"that [law] is the medium of the human community as community" 
(p. 34), his attempt to integrate this philosophical, community-ori-
ented framework with the realities of the law of the sea and coast is 
often unconvincing. While the metaphor of law as medium is, by 
Ball's own admission, only fully viable in a legal system founded on 
shared community values, the law of the sea and coast (as well as most 
other areas of law in our society) is instead rooted in intense interplay 
among competing, independent interests of parties often motivated by 
economic concerns. 
It is to this dilemma that the book's problematic sixth and final 
chapter is devoted. In Chapter Six, Ball recognizes that law as me-
dium is a flawed metaphor for the role of law in our society, but in-
stead of concentrating his energies on excising and promoting those 
aspects of his conception that are of value today, he attempts to evoke 
from theological sources a "Peaceable Kingdom" in which the entire 
metaphor would be valid. As Professor Ball recognizes in the book's 
preface, the value of such an enterprise to most readers is not immedi-
ately apparent (p. xiii). Although his self-consciousness is admirable, 
his insistence on moving the book toward a utopian rather than a more 
2. As the author himself notes: "There is nothing inherent in the natural world that deter· 
mines what we make of its figurative possibilities. This is another way of saying again that there 
is not an objective truth-in-itself out there to which our words are to correspond." P. 28. 
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limited and practical conclusion obscures obvious inconsistencies and 
counterarguments, and bypasses opportunities to emphasize the prac-
tical applications of his insights. 
Professor Ball often merely illustrates the obvious notion that 
man's preconceptions are a negative.force insofar as they limit his abil-
ity to reason creatively and to take account of alternative points of 
view. He considers, for example, the loggerhead turtle, a threatened 
species that conservationists (including Ball's son) are working to pro-
tect. One distinguishing characteristic of the loggerhead is its inability 
to blink. Thus, in their infrequent forays onto the beaches, these great 
turtles must shed tears to wash out the sand that gets into their eyes. 
Experienced turtle watchers like Professor Ball's son understand that 
this physiological reaction is entirely mechanical. Tourists, however, 
insist on making human attributions. Even after Ball's son explains 
the tears, tourists repeatedly ask: "Yes, but why are they so sad?" (p. 
4). 
As this anecdote illustrates, reality is what we make of it. 
Although the tourists presumably are not disturbed by the blatan,t in-
accuracy of their perceptions of the loggerhead, the son's understand-
ing of the turtle is not only more knowledgeable but also more 
responsible, because it is an understanding based on "livelier, richer 
realities" (p. 11). Professor Ball quite correctly points out that this 
ability to look beyond the strictures of preconceived realities has been 
an invaluable part of major scientific advances. 
But what of law? Professor Ball insists that if law is a science, it 
must necessarily be at least as creative a science as biology, physics, or 
astronomy, for "far more than turtles and black holes, law is our crea-
tion. There is no external, objective law or legal system for which we 
are the mere messengers and instruments" (p. 16). While Ball argues 
that law should be infused with creativity to move away from the law-
as-bulwark metaphor, he fails to acknowledge that the flip side to this 
argument is also plausible; that is, the very fact that no objective legal 
truths exist may be the strongest argument for preserving law as a bul-
wark. In defining limits, law protects society as a whole by keeping 
the powers that be in check. 
The law depends upon the consent of powerful interests to be via-
ble precisely because it is not founded on objective truths. Revolution-
ary scientific advances have the power to effect great upheavals 
because they represent a demonstrable movement toward truth. But 
having no similar source of independent power, law necessarily de-
pends upon consensual grants of power. In the modern world, law 
seeks "justice" not in an absolute sense, but rather within the parame-
ters delineated by those with economic and military might. Those 
with such might delegate power to legal systems because the resulting 
benefits of order and stability outweigh the reduction of power that is 
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necessarily incurred. Thus, in areas of the world in which legal sys-
tems are not effective in achieving order and stability, there is corre-
spondingly less incentive for powerful interests to work within the law. 
Implicit in Professor Ball's arguments against law as bulwark is a 
recognition of law's indebtedness to the consent of powerful interests. 
Indeed, he devotes the bulk of Chapter Two to the injustice engen-
dered by such a system, noting that "[t]he law-as-bulwark metaphor 
. . . allows injustice to harden into law which then commands obedi-
ence" (p. 25). As obvious examples, he cites tax and zoning laws, 
which in his view seek to preserve not justice but rather "maldistribu-
tion of wealth" and "economic-racial oppression" (p. 25). From this 
perspective, "law becomes the systemic, degenerative brute force of 
the powerful."3 
These observations contain quite a bit of truth, but to some extent 
the use to which Professor Ball puts them is an exercise in sophistry. 
Few champion a legal system that spews forth injustice unflinchingly 
for the sake of preserving the economic status quo. To be sure, our 
present legal system has such unjust aspects; however, it also has 
many beneficial aspects. By presenting examples that illustrate only 
the ugliness of the present system, however, Ball prepares the reader to 
accept his "alternative metaphor," law as medium. In contrast to the 
bulwark, law as medium lets "justice flow like water, and integrity like 
an unfailing stream."4 For Ball, law can be a means for communal 
communication; as society approaches the metaphoric ideal, this com-
munication would become so perfect as to obviate the need for explicit 
law. "In heaven," Professor Ball asserts, "law will become plentiful 
and, like the agreeable medium air, utterly transparent" (p. 35; foot-
note omitted). This argument is no less beautiful, and no more realis-
tic, than was Marx's vision of the communist ideal. 
The problem is that while law as medium speaks to the processes 
of law, law as bulwark speaks to the purposes of law. While better 
communication can certainly make the law more equitable, it can 
never serve as the basis for law itself. This can be seen by examining 
an anecdote Professor Ball uses to illustrate his conception of law as 
medium: 
Defensively, talk may prevent the use of force and may actually pro-
vide better protection than force - a cycle of words more satisfying than 
3. P. 27. These observations are, of course, not entirely true. Ball's discussion of particularly 
noxious zoning and tax laws cannot be generalized to include all zoning and tax laws. For 
example, while the author is correct in pointing out that some zoning laws hurt the poor because 
they are exclusionary, it is also true that many zoning laws primarily protect the interests of the 
whole community, even though they hurt the rich by preventing development. Environmental 
zoning comes immediately to mind. In these cases, zoning ordinances that impede development 
are upheld (and are not a "taking" requiring "just compensation") where they work to prevent a 
public harm. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
4. P. 33 (quoting Amos 5:24). 
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a cycle of vengeance. I once visited in a Maine summer home built by a 
person whom experience had taught that the casement windows in such 
a place could never be completely sealed against rainstorms blowing in 
from the Atlantic. He had devised a means for both accepting the inevi-
table and simultaneously protecting the interior from water damage. 
Fixed to the inside wall under each window ... were small lead troughs 
he had fashioned .... The apparatus caught and returned the vagrant, 
invading runnels of rain that blew in. It was a fit defensive works. For 
protection we may not need law-enforcement officers and uniformed 
troops. We do need ingenious plumbers and gutterers ... who keep the 
flow going. [pp. 31-32; footnote omitted] 
While the imagery in this passage is certainly alluring, its implications 
for law enforcement are obviously unrealistic within the context of our 
society. Is Ball to be understood as saying that instead of trying to 
punish the criminal, we should concentrate on adapting victims to the 
effects of crime? Enhanced communication and understanding be-
tween individuals can certainly help make law more responsive, but as 
this example illustrates, it is a woefully inadequate substitute for the 
many practical roles that law as bulwark fills. 
Related problems engendered by the metaphor/reality dichotomy 
present themselves quite apparently in Chapters Three, Four, and 
Five, in which the author examines the use of law as medium in the 
context of the law of the sea and coast. Chapter Three opens with a 
discussion of the development of the doctrine of "Mare Liberum" -
freedom of the seas. Initiated by Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth cen-
tury, this doctrine holds great superficial allure for proponents of law 
as medium. After all, as Professor Ball notes, "[i]n the economy of 
God, according to Grotius, no nation has been supplied with all the 
necessities of life. Human fellowship is thereby engendered through 
mutual needs and dispersed resources" (p. 39). Unfortunately, as Ball 
notes, "Grotius's arguments for the freedom of the seas were a piece of 
advocacy undertaken on behalf of a nationalistic client for commercial 
effect" (p. 43). Grotius wrote not as a prophet, but as an advocate for 
his client, the Dutch East India Company. 
Similarly, over three and one-half centuries later, the third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)-for all of 
its very real advances in enhancing cooperation among nations - still, 
in Ball's words, "constitutes an accommodation to capitalism" (p. 55). 
UNCLOS III not only produced the International Seabed Authority 
(a unique organ designed to share among all nations the riches of the 
seas), but it also made effective use of innovative negotiating rules 
which stressed consensus rather than antagonism.5 Nevertheless, even 
5. The tenor of the UNCLOS III negotiations has received considerable attention in legal 
periodicals. For a particularly interesting account of the Canadian ambassador's experiences, see 
Beesley, The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed Countries as Part-
ners - A Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 183 (1983). 
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this noble effort to create community-oriented law depended upon the 
consent of the powerful, a fact th.at was underscored when the United 
States abruptly refused to sign the treaty after the negotiations were 
completed. While the world had produced a treaty that arguably was 
the most effective use to date of law as medium, its effectiveness was 
largely emasculated by the noncooperation of a powerful nation look-
ing out for what it perceived to be its own best interests. 
In Chapter Four, Ball concentrates on examining the systems that 
the United States government has employed in various regulatory mat-
ters - particularly in leasing the Continental Shelf for oil exploration. 
As the author perceptively notes, the permit-approval process has 
come to encompass far more than mere technical evaluation. As con-
troversies about offshore leasing become more heated, and as Congress 
finds itself less willing (or able) to choose from among competing in-
terests, administrative agencies (and the permit-approval system that 
they oversee) become political forums in which groups can have their 
say. The "former cozy system involving only oilmen and the Secre-
tary of the Interior" (p. 83) is a thing of the past, and such devices as 
"the environmental impact statement together with judicial review" 
(p. 83) have taken its place. 
To be sure, this system has had the desirable effect of more fully 
representing adverse interests in the political process. However, as Ball 
once again realizes, this enhanced medium can do little to change the 
ultimate position of the powerless in society. In discussing the endan-
gered lifestyle of native Alaskans, he notes that: "If the viability of an 
indigenous people is to be balanced against the existence of the oil 
industry and American demand for oil, the people will not win. . . . 
For federalism to have meaning and to survive, it cannot consign any 
powerless minority's survival to a balancing test" (p. 90). Interest-
ingly, taken to its logical extreme, this argument actually supports the 
proposition that, where the minority is outgunned, law as bulwark 
may do more to help the powerless than law as medium. If a minority 
gains a voice through the hearing process (law as medium), its voice 
means little if it is easily overwhelmed by the majority so as merely to 
legitimate the majority's designs. On the other hand, real protection 
for the native Alaskans could be accomplished by direct grants of au-
tonomy and protection (law as bulwark). Powerful interests would, of 
course, be motivated to make such grants not by altruism, but rather 
by a pragmatic realization that they will gain from the increased order 
and stability that result from such actions. Thus, while elements of 
the law-as-medium metaphor would be useful in revealing the 
problems of weaker interests, any real satisfaction of their concerns 
must arise from the bulwark. 
Professor Ball's fifth chapter extends his concern for the protection 
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of the powerless to the regulation of coastlands under state law. Quite 
correctly, he points out that the relatively unrestrained private devel-
opment of coastal properties has led, in many cases, to waste and de-
struction. The real losers in this system are those who have absolutely 
no voice - future generations. Professor Ball notes that law as me-
dium has already been used to address this problem through the "pub-
lic trust" doctrine. Under this elegantly simple system, private 
ownership of coastal property can only extend to the high-tide line, 
and any "[a]ctivities on private property that have impacts below the 
high-tide line may require permits and public hearings" (pp. 116-17). 
Of course, it must be remembered that any permit system has limi-
tations; there is no assurance that such a system (utilizing law as me-
dium) will not serve merely to legitimate the plans of powerful 
interests. But the public trust doctrine is most interesting for the use 
to which it puts law as medium. The doctrine utilizes law as medium 
as an adjunct to, not a replacement for, law as bulwark. This plan 
does not abolish private property rights, but merely confines them 
within new boundaries (an extension of the bulwark) that mark the 
beginning of a public trust. It is in this context that the idea of law as 
medium can be most useful. In such an arrangement, private property 
rights would still be protected to the extent necessary to achieve con-
sent of the powers that be, while in the most environmentally sensitive 
areas of the shoreline, elements of law as medium could be produc-
tively used to give a voice to unrepresented (or very weak) interests. It 
must again be emphasized, however, that law as medium is not doing 
away with the bulwark here. In fact, the public trust depends upon the 
creation of new boundaries; that is, law as medium can make the legal 
process work more effectively, but the law's purposes (here, to allocate 
property rights) remain the same, delineated by the competing inter-
ests that make up the conception of law as bulwark. 
Ball's digression into the fanciful utopian "Peaceable Kingdom" in 
Chapter Six is not only disappointing, but also unproductive for the 
legal reader.6 The legal issues posed by the problems of the sea and 
coast, as Ball demonstrates, provide fertile ground for attempts to 
make the law more responsive to the needs of the powerless. 
Although completely replacing "law as bulwark" with "law as me-
6. Professor Ball is a former theology student, and it must be pointed out that his description 
of "The Peaceable Kingdom" is so laden with theological and expressly religious musings as to 
be all but inaccessible to the average reader in some passages. The following is a good example of 
Ball's use of religion to underscore his call for a more community-oriented role for law: 
The penultimate always verges toward the ultimate. In fact we know what is penultimate 
only from the ultimate, which is immediately present. The kingdom of God, or the presence 
of God, occurs and is always about to occur at the center. It is always at hand in the 
specific, present form of the neighbor. To be directed toward the coming of Christ is to be 
directed by the neighbor. Natural life is an expectant political life, one Jived in a nexus of 
responsibility for others and with others. 
P. 129 (footnote omitted). 
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dium" makes little sense in the context of today's world, this does not 
require the invention of a new world. Rather, law as medium might 
best be used as a tool for highlighting the insensitivities of our present 
legal system, and for identifying the areas in which those insensitivities 
can be mitigated through improved communication. 
- Jon M. Lipshultz 
